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ABSTRACT 
This study provides unique evidence for the potential use of the implementation of anti-
takeover provisions (ATPs) as an indication of managerial influence in compensation setting 
processes within publicly traded firms. While many firms utilize anti-takeover provisions to 
protect their ability to adhere to its corporate strategy and policy, the imposition of an anti-takeover 
provision distinctly predicts both a structural and aggregate change in the compensation packages 
of CEOs in S&P 500 firms. In the three years following a firm’s implementation of an anti-
takeover provision, the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of total executive compensation 
increases by 42% relative to the CAGR across all S&P 500 firms. Moreover, these altered 
compensation plans more heavily favor increasing levels of stock-based and bonus-based 
compensation than the average packages of S&P 500 CEOs. Thus, this study provides principal 
evidence of managerial influence in the compensation setting processes within by publicly traded 
firms. 
 
Keywords: Executive compensation, managerial influence, anti-takeover provision, principal-
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INTRODUCTION 
Executive compensation packages have garnered significant scholarly debate over the past 
three decades. In 1965, the ratio of the average CEO’s pay to that of the average worker in the 
United States was approximately 20:1; however, in 2015, the same ratio grew exponentially to 
303:1.1 While the relative growth in the size of these packages is widely known, markedly less of 
the current scholarly discussion has focused on analyzing the attributes of increasingly dynamic 
compensation structures approved by publicly traded companies. The typical pay package for a 
CEO and other top executives consists of four parts: a base salary, an annual bonus tied to certain 
performance measures, stock grants and stock options, and a long‐term incentive plan and other 
perquisites.2 However, for the purposes of this research study, these four components are further 
segmented into six separate, observable components as defined by the Institutional Shareholders 
Services. Further, existing research has shown that stock awards and stock options, which 
accounted for 57.2% of CEO pay among S&P 500 companies in 2014, have been increasingly 
used by firms through a proposed justification of more effective alignment of the incentives of the 
CEO with those of common shareholders.3 However, this shift in the relative structure of 
compensation packages has accelerated the growth of total compensation granted to an executive 
in a given year. Additionally, recent trends in executive compensation highlight that many firms 
have utilized existing regulations, both from federal regulators and tax authorities, as baselines for 
executive compensation, rather than altering compensation to be within these boundaries.4 
                                                 
1 Till, Robert E., Mary Beth Yount. 2018. "Governance and Incentives: Is It Really All about the Money?" Journal 
of Business Ethics 1-15. 
2 Boatright, John R. 2010. "Executive Compensation: Unjust or Just Right?" The Oxford Handbook of Business 
Ethics 1-47. 
3 Reda, J., Tonello, M. 2015. "The Conference Board CEO and Executive Compensation Practices 2015 Edition Key 
Findings." The Conference Board 1-23. 
4 Kennedy, Kathryn J. 2012. "The Use of Federal Law to Curb Excessive Executive Compensation: Lessons in Past 
Failures and Lessons for the Future." Villanova Law Review 551-570. 
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Generally, the existing literature regarding executive compensation has attempted to analyze the 
impacts of rapidly expanding compensation structures. Previous analyses of executive 
compensation have led to a sustained dialogue among scholars, which aims to determine the most 
effective strategies for addressing this persistent rise in compensation over the last few decades; 
although, this literature has devoted fewer resources to developing legal reforms.5 Thus, further 
analyzing the incentives that pervade ongoing negotiations between executive and corporate 
boards will be instrumental in designing potential revisions to current regulations as a whole.  
Regulations imposed by stock exchanges, such as the NYSE and NASDAQ, as well as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Congress, have led to enhanced disclosure 
requirements regarding the structure of executive compensation packages provided by publicly 
traded firms. Thus, the consistent rise of stock-based compensation, coupled with a concurrent 
increase in disclosure and reporting by publicly traded firms, presents a unique opportunity to 
analyze the effects of these compensation packages in aligning the incentives of managers with 
shareholders. The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, this study will examine the current state 
of executive compensation and will analyze factors relating to the principal-agent problem in 
compensation negotiations. Second, this study will aim to develop and propose a series of 
recommendations regarding regulatory reform in order to better align the incentives of executives 
with those of the firms’ shareholders and to reduce the compensation costs currently borne by 
shareholders of publicly traded companies.  
For the purposes of this research study, shareholder value maximization will be 
normatively viewed as providing the same outcome as the maximization of firm value. The 
                                                 
5 Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2004. "Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues." Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance 8-23. ; Moriarty, Jeffrey. 2005. "Do CEOS Get Paid Too Much?" Business Ethics 
Quarterly 257-281 
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primary motivation for this assumption is that, barring circumstances of insolvency, the value of 
the debt of publicly traded firms should not fall below par, or face value, due to a significant level 
of shareholder value within publicly traded firms. As residual claimants to the value of a firm, 
shareholders capture any incremental increases in firm value above the level of indebtedness of a 
given firm. Undoubtedly, certain instances exist in which shareholder value maximization does 
not align with firm value maximization; however, for the purposes of this study, the two concepts 
are viewed as providing effectively indistinguishable outcomes. As will be discussed, current 
regulations fail to adequately incentivize corporate boards and executives to refrain from deal-
making that is not in the best interests of the shareholders of a firm. Accordingly, the 
recommendations proposed by this paper do not attempt to entirely eliminate the possibility that 
managers will exert substantial influence in advocating for either higher compensation or the 
implementation of anti-takeover provisions that grant them increased job security. Instead, the 
primary motivations for the recommendations provided by this paper, which would restrict the 
ability of publicly traded firms to enact changes to either anti-takeover provisions or the growth 
rate of compensation without providing a justification to shareholders, stem from the assumption 
that shareholders should be able to choose whether action is necessary for addressing these 
decisions. If shareholders remain apathetic following the revelation of the granting of favors to 
executives from the board of directors, the success of these proposed reforms does not change. 
Simply, these reforms enable shareholders to be more informed and to more easily arrive at a 
decision in shareholder votes than in the status quo. 
Scholars, managers, and shareholders distinctly benefit from the findings of this research 
project as it provides evidence for the need to reinforce existing corporate governance regulations 
and may impact the future structure of intracompany power dynamics. Much of the existing 
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research has explored the systematic reasons for the “ratcheting” of compensation packages as a 
whole; however, this study will likely contribute to the ongoing scholarly debate by providing a 
series of proposed reforms that could alleviate many of the effects of the principal-agent problem. 
Managers and shareholders will be distinctly interested in the findings of this research project as 
it will likely carry unique implications for future negotiations of executive compensation packages 
for publicly traded companies. Further, this research study will largely contribute to the existing 
scholarly discussion regarding executive compensation in that it provides evidence for the 
managerial power hypothesis proposed by Bebchuk and Fried in 2003.6 Lastly, stock exchanges 
and the SEC could potentially utilize the findings and recommendations of this research project in 
order to reinforce the regulatory reforms proposed to federal lawmakers, which may help to better 
align the incentives of managers and shareholders for publicly traded companies moving forward. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overview of Moral and Legal Framework Analyses 
Current research focusing on the practices that have led to rapidly increasing executive 
compensation packages is characterized by two salient categories. The first category of research 
has established various moral frameworks, which attempt to determine the “justness” of 
compensation packages in terms of both the total wealth and the relative level of pay given to 
executives.7 This field of literature has argued, for example, that elevated levels of executive 
compensation are unjustifiable from a utility generation perspective and are harmful to employee 
                                                 
6 Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem." Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 71-92. 
7 Néron, Pierre-Yves. 2014. "Egalitarianism and Executive Compensation: A Relational Argument." Journal of 
Business Ethics 1-14. ; Boatright, John R. 2010. "Executive Compensation: Unjust or Just Right?" The Oxford 
Handbook of Business Ethics 1-47. 
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morale and societal welfare as executives do not provide vast multiples of the value created by a 
regular employee in the status quo.8 Alternatively, the second category has put forth legal 
interpretations and has suggested regulatory reforms within the field of executive compensation in 
order to alleviate the principal-agent problem that seemingly pervades compensation-setting 
procedures in the status quo.9 More specifically, the principal-agent problem that pervades the 
current negotiations processes regarding executive compensation stems from the CEOs innate 
desire to maximize his or her compensation to the detriment of the shareholders of the firm.10 This 
area of research has explored the links between regulations, such as those imposed by the SEC and 
stock exchanges, and the evolving structures of executive compensation more broadly. Research 
in this field has criticized the procedures currently employed by major firms to develop and audit 
compensation packages under the assumption that they are intrinsically prone to the influence 
accumulated by CEOs in their desire to enhance their compensation packages.11 Generally, 
findings from the current literature suggest that major corporations should enact policies that make 
executive compensation packages more transparent, increase independence and information 
dissemination within boards of directors and compensation committees, and create incentives that 
alleviate principal-agent concerns inherent within the approval process pertaining to compensation 
packages.12  
                                                 
8 Moriarty, Jeffrey. 2005. "Do CEOS Get Paid Too Much?" Business Ethics Quarterly 257-281.; Néron, Pierre-
Yves. 2014. "Egalitarianism and Executive Compensation: A Relational Argument." Journal of Business Ethics 1-
14. 
9 McCall, John J. 2004. "Assessing American Executive Compensation: A Cautionary Tale for Europeans." Journal 
of Business Ethics 243-254.; Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency 
Problem." Journal of Economic Perspectives 71-92.; Mcconvill, J. 2006. "Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Governance: Rising Above the "Pay-for-Performance" Principle." American Business Law Journal 413-438. 
10 While the relative change in compensation does not account for a significant amount of corporate profits in a 
given year, the reduction of overall value that is available for distribution to shareholders, through either dividends 
or stock repurchases, distinctly harms the shareholders of a firm. 
11 Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem." Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 71-92. 
12 Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2004. "Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues." Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance 8-23. 
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Overview of the Approval Process of Compensation Packages 
Existing research posits that executive compensation packages are audited and approved 
by multiple groups before being awarded to chief executive officers.13 Typically, the board of 
directors of a firm will form a compensation committee, composed of three to four independent 
directors, who provide a recommendation regarding the CEO’s proposed compensation package, 
using available data on other executive compensation packages in a given industry.14 Moreover, 
the board of directors will also hire compensation consultants to provide an analysis of similar 
CEO’s compensation.15 Finally, effectively all publicly traded corporations have implemented 
some form of “say-on-pay” measures in which shareholders are able to vote on the desired level 
of compensation to be given to the executives of a corporation at least every three years.16 Taken 
together, these processes and regulations are intended to ensure that the compensation granted to 
a CEO is set independently of the desires of the CEO. In defense of these substantial compensation 
packages, some scholars have argued that these negotiations are assumed to occur at an “arms-
length” in which the CEO and the board of directors are presumed to be robust to forces that could 
lead to excessive or inefficiently negotiated compensation packages.17 However, other scholars 
have argued that these systems fail to effectively curtail the “managerial power” exerted by CEOs 
over the board of directors and compensation consultants.18 This inherent tension in compensation 
                                                 
13 Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem." Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 71-92. 
14 Boatright, John R. 2010. "Executive Compensation: Unjust or Just Right?" The Oxford Handbook of Business 
Ethics 1-47. 
15 Ibid.; Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem." Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 71-92. 
16 Reda, J., and M. Tonello. 2015. "The Conference Board CEO and Executive Compensation Practices 2015 
Edition Key Findings." The Conference Board 1-23. 
17 Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2004. "Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues." Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance 8-23. 
18 Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem." Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 71-92. 
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negotiations between executives and the board of directors, within the context of existing 
regulations, has contributed to seemingly detrimental outcomes, such as the ratcheting of 
compensation packages, which stems from the board of directors’ hesitance to pay the CEO below 
the average reported by compensation consultants, and the increasing use of stock-based 
compensation as a means to “camouflage” the total amount of compensation a CEO receives in a 
given period.19 This research has emphasized that the board of directors has perverse incentives to 
appease the CEO and provide him or her with elevated compensation stemming from their desire 
to be reelected, their social connections to the CEO, and the potential for reciprocal increases in 
their compensation to be approved by the CEO.20 Overall, the existing literature highlights the 
need to diminish executive influence over the compensation setting techniques used by firms as a 
whole.21 Without increased independence, compensation packages may continue to be subject to 
structural manipulation by executives in order to enable rent extraction (i.e. wages that are above 
the necessary rate required for executives to fully execute their duties) from shareholders, who are 
regarded as the ultimate owners of a firm.22  
 
Overview of Anti-Takeover Provisions 
Throughout the 1980s, many firms experienced increased takeover interest from private 
equity firms aiming to generate returns through taking companies private with elevated levels of 
leverage and existing industry giants who aimed to take advantage of more relaxed anti-trust 
                                                 
19 Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2004. "Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues." Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance 8-23. 
20 Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2004. "Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues." Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance 8-23. 
21 Moriarty, Jeffrey. 2005. "Do CEOS Get Paid Too Much?" Business Ethics Quarterly 257-281. 
22 Ashley, Allan S, and Yang S Simon. 2004. "Executive Compensation and Earnings Persistence." Journal of Business 
Ethics 369-382. 
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enforcement by the Reagan Administration.23 As many of these takeovers were consummated on 
a hostile basis, where the target firm does not solicit or advocate for the takeover, many corporate 
boards and managers sought to implement anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) in order to reduce the 
prevalence of these undesired acquisitions.24 Further, in order to address the increasing prevalence 
of these anti-takeover provisions, the Delaware Supreme Court had initially called for a two-tiered 
proportionality review of these provisions in Unocal v Mesa Petroleum.25 The prongs required an 
assessment of whether the imposition of the anti-takeover provision was in response to a legitimate 
threat to corporate policy and whether the imposed provision was proportionate to the threat 
presumed by the board of directors.26 However, this two-tiered review was effectively removed 
through the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions in Unitrin, Inc. v American General Corp. and 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v Time Warner, Inc.27 Thus, despite an initial check on the level 
of managerial and board power to impose anti-takeover provisions, the effective grant of near-
unilateral power to corporations to ward off corporate raiders and hostile conglomerates led to a 
marked increase in the prevalence of anti-takeover provisions as a whole.28 While there are many 
forms of anti-takeover provisions used by firms, only a select few have been shown to effectively 
influence both the prevalence of takeovers and the premia paid to target firms.29  
                                                 
23 Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1990. "The Takeover Wave of the 1980s." Science 745-749. 
24 Ibid.; Arlen, Jennifer. 2002. "Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover Defenses: Private Contracting, Legal 
Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies." The University of Chicago Law Review 917-931. 
25 Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co, 493 A2d 946, 954 (Del 1985). 
26 Arlen, Jennifer. 2002. "Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover Defenses: Private Contracting, Legal 
Intervention, and Unforeseen Contingencies." The University of Chicago Law Review 917-931. 
27 Ibid.; Unitrin, Inc. v American General Corp, 651 A2d 1362 (Del 1995); Paramount Communications, Inc. v Time 
Warner, Inc., 571 A2d1140 (Del 1989). 
28 Sokolyk, Tatyana. 2010. "The Effects of Antitakeover Provisions on Acquisition Targets." Journal of Corporate 
Finance 612-627. 
29 Ibid.; Comment, R., and G. W. Schwert. 1995. "Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth 
Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures." Journal of Financial Economics 3-43.; DeAngelo, H., and E. Rice. 
1983. "Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Stockholder Wealth." Journal of Financial Economics 329-360. 
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 Many previous academic studies have utilized the G-Index as a proxy in order to determine 
the relative prevalence of anti-takeover provisions.30 While the G-Index incorporates twenty-four 
anti-takeover provisions, many of these provisions have been found to have relatively little, or 
mixed, impact on takeover dynamics in the market.31 Some of the more common takeover 
provisions and their impact on the likelihood of takeover provisions are outlined as follows. A 
classified board, also referred to as a staggered board, indicates that the board of directors of a firm 
is divided, for the purpose of election, into separate classes limiting the number of the firm’s 
directors can be voted upon each year. Commonly, directors are elected in three classes, allowing 
for only one-third of the board of directors to change in a given proxy vote held by the firm. Thus, 
by staggering the time periods in which directors can be elected, it becomes incrementally more 
difficult to gain control over a target company, despite owing potentially more than half of a 
company’s stock as a majority of a firm’s directors do not stand for election in a given year. This 
anti-takeover provision enables firms to prevent hostile bidders from acquiring a large voting 
stake, replacing the existing directors, and incentivizing them to the acquirer’s bid for the firm. A 
second anti-takeover provision explored in this paper relates to shareholder rights plans, more 
specifically poison pills. This anti-takeover provision enables a firm to undertake actions that make 
the target firm more financially unattractive to acquire or would dilute the voting interest of the 
potential acquirer. Generally, poison pills grant shareholders rights to purchase additional shares 
of stock in the target firm at a discount, approximately fifty percent, to the market price if the 
hostile bidder does not seek and receive board approval from the target firm’s board of directors 
after acquiring a certain percentage, typically twenty percent, of the outstanding stock. This anti-
                                                 
30 Chava, S., D. Livdan, and A. K. Purnanadam. 2008. "Do shareholder rights affect the cost of bank loans?" Review 
of Financial Studies 2973–3004. 
31 Core, J. E., W. R. Guay, and T. O. Rusticus. 2006. "Does weak governance cause weak stock returns? An 
examination of firm operating performance and investors expectations." The Journal of Finance 655-687. 
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takeover provision effectively dilutes the shares the hostile bidder has acquired, which increases 
the effective cost of the acquisition in comparison to the scenario in which the board approves the 
tender offer. Thus, poison pills normatively incentivize cooperation between the target firm and 
the acquirer to negotiate and agree upon the terms of an acquisition under the threat of decreased 
financial attractiveness and increased total expenditures. Golden parachutes are severance 
agreements between companies and their executives that require a payout contingent on a change 
in corporate control. These agreements effectively require the acquiring firm to pay an inflated 
sum of compensation to a target firm’s executives, increasing the effective price of purchasing a 
firm in the event of a takeover. While this anti-takeover provision has been demonstrated to reduce 
managerial resistance to takeovers, due to the incentive it provides to accept a takeover offer, the 
acquiring firm must incorporate these payouts into the total cost of an acquisition.32 A publicly 
traded firm may also issue dual-class shares, another anti-takeover provision that allows a firm to 
maintain multiple classes of shares with different voting and ownership rights. In some cases, a 
particular class of stock may have five to ten times the voting rights of the common stock, referred 
to as super-voting rights, which effectively reduces the ability of a hostile acquirer to accumulate 
the votes needed in the open market to approve a takeover. Additionally, some publicly traded 
firms may attach special rights to these shares asymmetrically, such as the ability to elect a 
particular percentage of the directors of a firm. Thus, by shifting the voting dynamics among the 
interested parties, proxy votes become a less viable method to force the consummation of a 
takeover. Firms may also implement restrictions to the voting abilities of certain classes of their 
stock in order to reduce the ability of a hostile acquirer to acquire the percentage of stock required 
                                                 
32 Lund, Andrew C. W., and Robert J. Schonlau. 2017. "Golden Parachutes, Severance and Firm Value." Florida 
Law Review 875-906.; Sokolyk, Tatyana. 2010. "The Effects of Antitakeover Provisions on Acquisition 
Targets." Journal of Corporate Finance 612-627. 
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to consummate the takeover of the target firm. For instance, confidential voting, which limits the 
ability to determine which shareholders voted in favor of a proxy-vote, and cumulative voting, 
which allows shareholders to cast the votes associated with their shares in any proportion enable 
acquisition targets to impede the consummation of a takeover. Further, many firms implement 
limitations to the ability to amend the charter and bylaws. These limitations make it incrementally 
more difficult to remove other anti-takeover provisions, such as poison pills, without the consent 
of the existing board of directors. Last, some firms may implement a fair price requirement, which 
effectively mandates that the bidder pay all shareholders the highest price paid by the bidder for 
any of the shares it acquires in a target company during a specified period before the 
commencement of a tender offer. While this corporate governance measure does not explicitly 
make it more difficult to consummate a takeover of a firm, the ability of the target’s board of 
directors to remove this provision incentivizes discussion between the bidder and the target firm 
more generally.  
Despite the intuitive link between anti-takeover provisions and increased bargaining power 
for takeover targets, empirical data suggest that this link does not hold true. In fact, the removal of 
an anti-takeover provision has been shown to increase the probability of a takeover by 4.5% and 
increases the average takeover premium paid by 2.8%.33 While other confounding variables may 
impact the exact premium and likelihood associated with public acquisitions, the apparent 
detriment of anti-takeover provisions for shareholders seems to indicate that these provisions may 
be implemented as a means to protect executives, rather than to maximize shareholder value. 
Further, existing research also posits that countries which do not allow for US-style ATPs, 
particularly Australia, see both higher cumulative shareholder returns as well as long-run economic 
                                                 
33 Cuñat, Vicente, Mireia Giné, and Maria Guadalupe. 2016. "Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover 
Effects of Anti-Takeover Provisions." ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance 1-49. 
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gains through the operational improvements garnered by merged entities.34 While the comparison 
between the financial markets of the United States and other countries, such as Australia, is not 
entirely direct, the observable difference in the takeover arena seems to indicate that takeover 
provisions do not actually provide incremental benefits to either target firms or their shareholders 
more generally.35 Thus, while many varying forms of anti-takeover provisions are utilized by firms 
in the status quo, the vast majority of these defenses have distinct impacts on the relative frequency 
and structure of takeovers in the capital markets of the United States.  
 
Overview of Existing Executive Compensation Laws  
Generally, the processes for approving and determining the structure of executive 
compensation packages stem from regulations imposed by the Congress of the United States, 
various stock exchanges and the SEC. Beginning in 1918, Congress utilized the Internal Revenue 
Code (I.R.C.), to influence executive compensation through updating and changing the tax 
incentives associated with various compensation structures. For instance, Treasury Regulation § 
1.162-7 establishes the “reasonableness” standard of review in determining the level of executive 
compensation that can be deducted for tax purposes, and I.R.C. § 162(m) further establishes a $1 
million dollar cap on the amount of compensation that can be deducted that was not performance-
based.36 Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) utilizes twelve factors to determine the 
reasonableness of compensation in the IRS Revenue Manual § 4.35.2.5.2.2, such as the nature of 
the employee’s duties, background, and expertise, which all relate to the amount that would be 
                                                 
34 Humphery-Jenner, Mark L., and Ronan G. Powell. 2011. "Firm size, takeover profitability, and the effectiveness 
of the market for corporate control: Does the absence of anti-takeover provisions make a difference?" Journal of 
Corporate Finance 418-437. 
35 Although some firms may have other goals, such as creating societal value, value is presumed to be dependent on 
the market valuation of a given firm.  
36 Kennedy, Kathryn J. 2012. "The Use of Federal Law to Curb Excessive Executive Compensation: Lessons in Past 
Failures and Lessons for the Future." Villanova Law Review 551-570. 
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paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances.37 I.R.C. § 280G and 4999 
restricted the level of golden parachute payments that qualify as being tax deductible to three times 
an executive’s base pay and imposed a 20% excise tax payable by the executive in the event of an 
acquisition, respectively. Lastly, Congress attempted to reign in deferred compensation payments 
to executives, such that these payments could be accelerated through various methods resulting in 
elevated pay each year, through I.R.C. § 457A, which imposed a 20% excise tax plus interest 
imposed on compensation received through deferred compensation structures.38 However, nearly 
every piece of legislation enacted through Congress and their use of the I.R.C. led to adverse 
circumstances in which the maximums imposed by these regulations become an overarching 
benchmark for the compensation of CEOs. For instance, the salaries paid to CEOs coalesced to 
the $1 million-dollar benchmark deductible for tax purposes, and the minimum size of golden 
parachutes converged to the three times multiple permissible by the IRS Revenue Manual.39  
In response to prior legislations ability to reign in compensation schemes, congressional 
legislators shifted a sizable amount of their regulatory initiatives to federal securities laws, 
particularly the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.40 These securities 
laws particularly focused on disclosure requirements, and Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act in 2002 further requiring corporations to establish independent audit committees, which 
inevitably initiated the increasing robustness of compensation committees in the status quo.41 
Further, the SEC altered proxy disclosure requirements in order to examine the firm’s 
compensation structures for the size, structure, and potential risks intrinsic to certain compensation 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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packages as a whole.42 This alteration further increased the robustness of the Compensation 
Committee of publicly traded firms in that all conflicts of interest, both within the compensation 
committee and among compensation consultants, were required to be disclosed in order to allow 
regulators and intra-firm auditors to better analyze whether executives could potentially exert 
influence over the structure of their compensation packages as a whole.43  
Finally, after reviewing the success of certain regulations, particularly the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP), imposed during the financial meltdown, Congress extended many of the 
regulations imposed on financial institutions to all publicly traded companies.44 Through the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) an 
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, establishing Section 14 of the regulation.45 In 
addition to lowering the I.R.C. § 162(m) deduction from $1 million to $500,000, other exclusions 
were significantly reduced, such as those regarding golden parachutes and incentive compensation, 
and established shareholder say-on-pay initiatives to ensure that the shareholders of a firm were 
able to vote on executive compensation packages.46 However, these shareholder proxy votes do 
not bind the firm to alter an executive’s compensation package following an adverse outcome; 
rather, the vote simply serves more as an indication of shareholder agreement with a particular 
form and value of compensation.47 Further, Section 952 § 10C(a) (2) of the Dodd-Frank Act 
established enhanced independence standards within the Compensation Committee of the board 
of directors of a firm as a potential means to reduce the likelihood of the conveyance of benefits 
as a result of the exertion of managerial influence.  
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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MOTIVATIONS FOR THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
Generally, the failure of prior regulations to curb the growth of executive compensation, 
along with a parallel failure to eliminate the availability of pathways for managers to exert 
influence over various members of the board of directors and compensation committees, highlights 
the need for a significant redesign of both federal and securities regulations. While the findings of 
this research paper are not intended to provide evidence as to the justness or appropriateness of the 
level of executive compensation in the status quo, the motivation for this research paper is to 
attempt to underscore the need for both increased independence in compensation setting 
procedures and more restrictive corporate governance regulations. Recent trends in executive 
compensation packages indicate that previous reforms, particularly say-on-pay requirements 
imposed by Dodd-Frank have incentivized a shift away from salary and cash-based compensation 
towards more sophisticated forms of compensation, such as stock-based compensation, which are 
largely deemed to incentivize managers to act in the best interests of shareholders as a whole. 
Despite this seemingly logical shift away from legislation that simply attempts to curtail runaway 
compensation growth, idiosyncratic shifts in both the size and structure of executive compensation 
packages in the years following the implementation of an anti-takeover provision highlight the 
need for a purposeful redesign of corporate governance procedures. These potential reforms are 
discussed later in this research study and will be instrumental in ensuring that managers’ 
interactions with their firm occur on an arms-length basis. 
While the existing literature focuses primarily on the necessity of reforming executive 
compensation, the justifications for such reforms vary widely. Many of the moral justifications for 
executive compensation reform focus on mitigating distributive and relational wealth inequality, 
as well as reducing unjustifiable compensation given to CEOs when viewed from a social utility 
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perspective.48 However, the existing legal scholarship focuses on either shareholder or stakeholder 
value maximization as its primary justification for reforming executive compensation.49 In fact, 
much of the existing literature highlights the fact that CEO compensation, on average, accounts 
for 8% of corporate profits in a given period.50 As a result, this research paper will attempt to 
establish broad trends in executive compensation packages approved by firms in the status quo. 
Specifically, not only will this research aim to assess the effectiveness of executive compensation 
packages in incentivizing firm value-maximizing actions undertaken by executives, but it will also 
aim to derive policy recommendations that mitigate the principal-agent problem that exists in 
compensation setting techniques in the status quo.51 
Overall, existing research has debated the need for executive compensation reform as a 
whole. While authors have divergent views regarding the proper justifications for rejecting current 
compensation structures as inadequate, much remains to be established in terms of modifying 
intra-firm negotiation dynamics and reducing the principal-agent problem inherent in 
compensation negotiations as a whole. My research will aim to suggest a series of reforms to 
existing regulations established by stock exchanges and the SEC, which have inherently affected 
the evolution of executive compensation packages over the past three decades. More specifically, 
my research will explore the potential effects that increased board independence and a universal 
                                                 
48 Néron, Pierre-Yves. 2014. "Egalitarianism and Executive Compensation: A Relational Argument." Journal of 
Business Ethics 1-14.; Moriarty, Jeffrey. 2005. "Do CEOS Get Paid Too Much?" Business Ethics Quarterly 257-
281. 
49 Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem." Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 71-92.; Mcconvill, J. 2006. "Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: Rising 
Above the "Pay-for-Performance" Principle." American Business Law Journal 413-438. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Till, Robert E., and Mary B. Yount. 2018. "Governance and Incentives: Is It Really All about the 
Money?" Journal of Business Ethics 1-15.; Moriarty, Jeffrey. 2005. "Do CEOS Get Paid Too Much?" Business 
Ethics Quarterly 257-281.; McCall, John J. 2004. "Assessing American Executive Compensation: A Cautionary 
Tale for Europeans." Journal of Business Ethics 243-254.; Boatright, John R. 2010. "Executive Compensation: 
Unjust or Just Right?" The Oxford Handbook of Business Ethics 1-47. 
 19 
third-party audit committee may have in reducing the managerial influence that CEOs exert over 
the structure of their compensation benefits in a given year. Thus, while existing research has 
analyzed the moral and legal principles surrounding the executive compensation debate in the 
United States, my research will synthesize elements from both sides in a series of proposed reforms 
with the intention to reduce many of the agency costs associated with executive compensation in 
its current form. 
 
METHODS 
Research Techniques Overview  
The entirety of the data used in this analysis is accessible through Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS). Because information relating to private companies is not publicly available as 
these firms are not subject to many of the disclosure requirements imposed by stock exchanges 
and the SEC, this paper is primarily focused on proposing regulatory reforms for publicly traded 
companies. The analysis conducted in this paper focuses on interpreting publicly available data 
regarding current executive compensation packages and firm-level nuances that influence 
compensation negotiations as a whole. The conclusions reached through this analysis will are not 
intended to be viewed as a judgment as to the justness or level of efficiency of existing 
compensation packages; rather, this paper primarily explores the potential need for reform of 
corporate governance regulations to better ensure compensation setting procedures are adequately 
independent as a whole. Overall, by analyzing publicly available data, the goal of this paper is to 
derive systematically beneficial recommendations for firms and regulatory authorities as a whole. 
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Overview of Data Sources 
ExecuComp Database Overview 
The analysis utilized in this research paper primarily relies on data executive compensation from 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) Compustat ExecuComp database, which aggregates detailed executive 
compensation data from publicly traded firms through annual proxy statements from DEF 14A 
forms filed with the SEC.52 The data used in this analysis regarding executive compensation are 
available publicly, and access to Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) was used in order to 
collect the data. With the implementation of FAS123R, which required the disclosure of fair-value 
measurements of equity-based compensation, Compustat - Capital IQ’s ExecuComp 
(ExecuComp) database aggregates time series data since 1992 detailing breakdown of the value of 
each component of an executive’s compensation (i.e. salary, bonus, stock awards, option grants, 
non-equity compensation, pension awards, and all other compensation) for publicly traded firms. 
The ExecuComp dataset includes over 3462 companies, both active and inactive covering all 
constituent stocks within the S&P 1500, excluding ADRs which do not file proxy statements with 
the SEC. For the purposes of this analysis, data were queried from this database for all S&P 500 
firms currently within the index with data dating to 2010. Because some firms have recently been 
added to the index, some executive compensation data dating to 2010 were incomplete and were 
excluded from the analysis in this paper. Further, because not all firms have filed proxy statements 
with the SEC as of the writing of this paper, information regarding executive compensation levels 
in 2018 are excluded from this study in order to improve the accuracy and consistency of these 
findings. In order to balance practicality with the ability to derive structurally significant 
conclusions, this research study primarily focuses on the compensation packages of firms within 
                                                 
52 Dah, Mustafah, Mohammad Jizi, and Sadim Sbeity. 2017. "Board Independence and Managerial 
Authority." Benchmarking: An International Journal 838-53. 
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the S&P 500 Index. Each unique observation for the compensation of executives in a given year 
are also coded with the name of the executive, the identifying ticker of the firm, and the year the 
compensation was granted. 
 
Institutional Shareholder Services Database Overview 
The Institutional Shareholder Services database (ISS) aggregates many measures relating 
to corporate governance measures undertaken by publicly traded firms. The data provided by ISS 
enables many large money managers, such as pension funds, to make decisions regarding the 
suitability of a particular investment in a publicly traded company. With regards to this research 
study, the data used primarily stem from the IRRC Governance database, also referred to as the 
IRRC Takeover Defense database (IRRC). This database provides information on takeover 
defenses and other corporate governance provisions for firms included in the S&P 1500 index. For 
the purposes of this analysis, the number of anti-takeover provisions is not considered as relevant 
to the analysis undertaken in this study. Instead, the relative change in the number of anti-takeover 
provisions is considered in order to effectively track the potential influence of managers over the 
corporate governance actions undertaken by a firm. By assessing the relative level of compensation 
before and after the implementation of anti-takeover provisions, as well as the relative structure of 
these compensation packages, this research is largely intended to discern whether anti-takeover 
provisions are an indication of an executive’s power to influence the board of directors and 
compensation consultants to grant particular forms of compensation. 
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Combined Dataset for S&P 500 Firms 
The analysis provided by this research study depends on the combination of both the 
ExecuComp and IRRC databases into an aggregated dataset. While both databases provide 
identifying information for each firm, such as the ticker and year of the information, a unique 
identifier for each company and year was created in order to better ensure the accuracy of the 
analysis. For each unique combination, the “&” function of Excel was used to combine the ticker 
and year, which are provided as two separate variables into a single identifies. For instance, in 
looking at the data regarding American Airlines, ticker AAL, in the year 2012, the “&” function 
combines “AAL” and “2012” into “AAL2012” (i.e. “AAL&2012” yields “AAL2012”). After 
creating a unique identifier for each firm and year, the relative change in the number of takeover 
defenses in place by a firm is calculated. If a firm has implemented one of the eight takeover 
defenses used in this study, i.e. classified board, golden parachute, poison pill, confidential voting, 
cumulative voting, dual class stock, fair price requirement, limit ability to amend bylaws, and limit 
ability to amend charter, the IRRC database codes the variable as “YES” in that year. For instance, 
if Aflac, ticker AFL, has a golden parachute in 2012, the cell corresponding to the row with 
AFL2012 and the variable column “Golden Parachutes” would populate as a “YES”. In order to 
calculate the relative change in the number of takeover defenses, the “=counta()” function of Excel 
was used. This function counts the number of non-blank cells across the nine anti-takeover 
provision variable columns. After calculating the number of anti-takeover provisions utilized by 
these firms each year, the change in the number of provisions was calculated using a simple 
subtraction of the number of provisions in the current time period “T” minus the number in the 
previous period “T-1”. Then, using the “=if()” formula, another variable was generated, labeled as 
“CHECK” if the change in the number of anti-takeover provisions for a given company in that 
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period was either greater than or less than zero. Lastly, in order to generate the data set used to 
calculate the compound annual growth rates for firms that had recently implemented an anti-
takeover provision, another “=if()” statement was used that populated the variable, labeled as “x”, 
if the company had a positive change in the number of anti-takeover provisions in comparison to 
the previous period. 
 After generating the set of firms that had a positive change in the number of anti-takeover 
provisions used by the company, another “=if()” statement was used with an embedded “=and()” 
statement in order to pull the compensation data from the year prior “T-1” through the two years 
following “T+2” the increase in the number of anti-takeover provisions. The use of the embedded 
“=and()” statement ensured that the formula did not pull data from different companies within the 
dataset and pulled the compensation data from the correct time period. As some firms had recently 
implemented an additional anti-takeover provision, leading to a lack of data in the two years 
following the variable in question, the compensation data were manually assessed to ensure that 
the number of observations for each year was consistent. As a secondary check to ensure 
consistentency for all four years, a separate “=counta()” statement was used to tally the number of 
non-empty cells for each period and type of compensation data pulled from the aggregated dataset. 
After deducing the compensation data for firms with the desired change in the number of anti-
takeover provisions, summary statistics were created in order to compare the relative percentage 
that each compensation component accounted for in the total compensation granted to these 
executives. For instance, the amount of salary granted to an executive in the second year following 
the implementation of an additional anti-takeover provision, labeled as “Salary T+2”, was 
compared to the total value of the compensation granted to these executives, yielding the relative 
percentage accounted for by this compensation type, labeled as “Percentage of Total Comp. T+2”. 
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This calculation was repeated for each component of compensation, using a segmentation 
consistent with that of the IRRC Takeover Defense database, and the summaries of the proportions 
of each component of these compensation packages in the year the anti-takeover provision is 
implemented “T” and two years after “T+2” are shown in figure 1 and figure 2.  
Additionally, in order to calculate the relative growth rate of all components for this subset 
of S&P 500 firms, the change in the average value of each component was calculated. By taking 
the sum of the total compensation granted in the period “T+2” and subtracting the sum of the 
compensation of the same component in the period “T-1” a delta was calculated for each individual 
component. This change was converted to a growth factor relative to the period “T-1” by adding 
an additional 100% the percentage change between these periods. After calculating this 
multiplication factor, the compound annual growth rate, defined as the growth factor raised to the 
power of the inverse of the number of periods observed. Simply, a generic version of the formula 
used in the Excel would be as follows: “= (growth factor) ^ (1/number of periods)” yielding a final 
compound annual growth rate for this subset of S&P 500 firms, labeled as “CAGR (Defense 
YES)”. These growth rates were then compared to those of the average of all S&P 500 firms for 
the period from 2010 to 2017, which were calculated under similar methods, other than changing 
the number of periods observed from three to seven. These resulting growth rates were then used 
to create a side by side bar plot of the growth rates as shown in figure 3 and figure 4. 
 
RESULTS 
Overview 
 Broadly, the primary research question for this hypothesis analyzes whether current 
regulations regarding the effectiveness and independence of executive compensation is adequate 
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within the status quo. Due to the multi-faceted nature of this question, the results section of this 
paper will focus on highlighting data that point to potential inefficiencies in current regulations, 
and the section entitled “Discussion” will primarily explore the motivations, benefits, and 
implications of reforming the existing compensation laws and corporate governance regulations 
provided by federal and state authorities in the status quo.  
 
Relative Changes in the Composition of Executive Compensation 
Salary 
 As previously discussed, the salary portion of an executive’s compensation is a 
predetermined, cash-based form of compensating an executive, independent of his or her 
performance in guiding the firm. As shown in figure 1, salary accounted for approximately 9.4% 
of the total compensation granted to an executive in the year an additional anti-takeover provision 
was implemented. However, as shown in figure 2, salary accounted for approximately 8.1% of the 
total compensation granted, an associated 14.2% decrease in the relative percentage of total 
compensation.  
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Figure 1: This figure displays the average composition of executive compensation packages in the 
year that an anti-takeover provision is implemented. Stock awards comprised the most significant 
portion of total compensation (39.5%), followed by non-equity incentive plan compensation 
(21.0%), option awards (16.7%), salary (9.4%), pension-based compensation (7.4%), bonuses 
(3.3%), and all other compensation (2.6%) 
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Figure 2: This figure displays the average composition of executive compensation packages two 
years after, T+2, an anti-takeover provision is implemented. Stock awards comprised the most 
significant portion of total compensation (49.7%), followed by non-equity incentive plan 
compensation (14.3%), option awards (13.1%), salary (8.1%), all other compensation (7.3%), 
pension-based compensation (5.3%), and bonuses (2.4%). 
 
Bonus 
 Another cash-based component of an executive’s compensation, bonuses are set either as 
a preset percentage of the salary granted to an executive or vary based on performance relative to 
a set of objective criteria and benchmarks. While initially accounting for 3.3% of an executive’s 
compensation in the year an anti-takeover provision has been implemented, this component 
accounted for 2.4% of the total compensation two years after the implementation of an anti-
 28 
takeover provision. This change is associated with a 26.6% decrease relative to the proportion 
comprised by this form of compensation in the initial year.  
 
Stock Awards 
 Stock awards are a non-cash form of compensation granted to executives each year. In the 
year of an anti-takeover provision’s implementation, stock awards accounted for 39.5% of total 
compensation and 49.7% of total compensation two years following the implementation. This 
25.8% increase in the relative proportion of total compensation explained by stock awards appears 
to indicate an increased emphasis placed on non-cash compensation two years after the 
implementation of an anti-takeover provision relative to its proportion in the year the provision is 
implemented. 
 
Option Awards 
 Another non-cash form of compensation, option awards are typically granted as a way to 
align the long-term incentives of an executive with the shareholders of a firm, due to the need for 
the stock price of a firm to appreciate before the options are in the money. In the period an 
additional anti-takeover provision is implemented, option awards accounted for 16.7% of total 
compensation and 13.1% two years following the implementation. This 21.7% decrease in the 
relative portion of total compensation explained by option awards indicates an increasing level of 
emphasis placed on stock awards, a more immediate form of equity-based compensation, rather 
than overarching favoritism given to equity-based compensation as a whole. 
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Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation 
Non-equity incentive plans provide specific targets and goals for a firm to meet in order 
for an executive to be granted additional compensation in a given period. Initially accounting for 
21.0% of total compensation in the year an additional anti-takeover provision is implemented, non-
equity incentive plan compensation accounted for 14.3% of total compensation two years after the 
implementation of the provision. This 32.3% decrease indicates a shift towards equity-based, more 
specifically stock-based compensation, following the implementation of an anti-takeover 
provision.  
 
Pension-Based Compensation 
Pension-based compensation is comprised of both above-market earnings from deferred 
compensation plans and aggregate increases in the actual value of defined benefit and other long-
term pension plans. Initially accounting for 7.4% of total compensation in the year an additional 
anti-takeover provision is implemented, pension-based compensation accounted for 5.3% of total 
compensation two years after the implementation of the provision. This 29.3% decrease is likely 
due to a decrease in the above-market earnings provided by deferred compensation plans as 
executives are compensated more heavily in stock awards. 
 
All Other Compensation 
All other compensation effectively functions as a catchall for the compensation that does 
not fit into the other buckets set by the ExecuComp database. This form of compensation includes 
severance payments, debt forgiveness, imputed interest, payouts for the cancellation of stock 
options, payment for unused vacation, tax reimbursements, signing bonuses, 401K contributions, 
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and life insurance premiums. Initially accounting for 2.6% of total compensation in the year an 
additional takeover provision is implemented, all other compensation accounted for 7.3% of total 
compensation two years after the implementation of the provision. This 176.5% increase indicates 
a marked shift in the manner in which executives are compensated by their firms as a whole.  
 
Overall Trends  
 Aside from stock awards and all other compensation, each segment of an executive’s 
compensation explained a relatively lower portion of the total compensation paid to an executive 
in a given year. Both forms of cash-based compensation, salary and bonus, declined by double-
digit percentages relative to their starting value in the year an additional anti-takeover provision 
was implemented. Moreover, long-term incentive plans, such as option awards, non-equity 
incentive plan compensation, and pension-based compensation, ubiquitously declined relative to 
their starting proportions in the year of an ATP’s implementation. This appears to indicate a shift 
towards stock-based compensation, which may be utilized as a potential means to align the 
interests of the managers of a firm with those of the shareholders. However, as noted in the next 
section, the relative growth rates of each of these compensation components, along with the growth 
rate of the total value of compensation appear to indicate that managers may be exerting influence 
over their compensation packages more broadly.  
 
Observed Changes in the Growth Rates of Executive Compensation 
Overview 
 The basis for determining the potential value of using a firm’s implementation of anti-
takeover provisions as an indicator for managerial power largely stems from observing a change 
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in the growth rate of the components of executive compensation and the overall size of the 
packages as a whole. This section explores the robustness of this indicator variable through 
reporting the observed growth rates for both the S&P 500 and firms that have recently implemented 
an additional anti-takeover provision, and this section also reports the change using the entirety of 
the S&P 500 as the baseline control group.  
 
Figure 3: This figure displays the compound annual growth rates for each component of executive 
compensation packages, as well as total compensation, and excludes all other compensation as the 
scale becomes distorted due to the significant increase in the growth rate of all other compensation 
following the implementation of an anti-takeover provision.  For all firms within the S&P 500, 
salaries increased at an average rate of 1.3%, bonuses declined at a rate of -7.3%, stock awards 
increased at a rate of 9.3%, option awards increased at a rate of 2.6%, non-equity incentive 
compensation increased at a rate of 1.5%, pension-based compensation declined at a rate of 3.7%, 
and total compensation increased at a rate of 4.1%. Following the implementation of an anti-
takeover provision, salaries increased at an average rate of 0.6%, bonuses declined at a rate of 
4.5%, stock awards increased at a rate of 14.3%, option awards declined at a rate of 2.4%, non-
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equity incentive compensation declined at a rate of 7.0%, pension-based compensation declined at 
a rate of 5.7%, and total compensation increased at a rate of 5.9%. 
 
Figure 4: This figure reports the same data as figure 3 but includes the compound annual growth 
rate for all other compensation. For all S&P 500 firms, the average growth rate of all other 
compensation grew at an average rate of 6.3%, while firms that had recently implemented an anti-
takeover provision displayed an average growth rate of 48.6% for all other compensation. Overall, 
the growth rate of stock-based and aggregate compensation (total) are markedly higher in firms 
that have implemented at least one anti-takeover provision than the average for all S&P 500 firms.  
 
Salary 
 Because of the restrictions to the tax deductibility of the salary paid to an executive in a 
given year, the growth rate of salary-based compensation tends to be relatively low (Kennedy 
2012).53 For all S&P 500 firms, salary-based compensation grew at a compound annual growth 
                                                 
53 Kennedy, Kathryn J. 2012. "The Use of Federal Law to Curb Excessive Executive Compensation: Lessons in Past 
Failures and Lessons for the Future." Villanova Law Review 551-570. 
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rate of 1.3% from 2010 to 2017, which is approximately twice the growth rate of 0.6% for firms 
that had recently implemented an anti-takeover provision. This 52.3% decrease in the growth rate 
of salary-based compensation may be a non-significant effect caused more so by existing 
regulation rather than by managerial influence. 
 
Bonus 
 While bonuses have displayed a recent decline due to the rise of equity-based incentive 
compensation, the rate of this decline slows in the period following the implementation of an anti-
takeover provision. The average rate of decline in bonus compensation is 7.3%, while this rate of 
decline is 4.5% for firms that had recently implemented an anti-takeover provision. While this 
38.2% decline in the rate of decline of bonus-based pay is uniquely different from zero, bonuses 
account for a relatively small proportion of total compensation for these firms, approximately two 
to three percent, meaning that this decreasing rate of decline has less of an impact on overall 
compensation than other components. 
 
Stock Awards 
 Many firms have shifted towards an increased use of stock awards as a means to align 
managerial incentives with those of shareholders. However, while the average growth rate in stock 
awards for the S&P 500 was 9.3%, the rate of increase for firms that had recently implemented an 
anti-takeover provision was 14.3%. This corresponds to a 54.2% increase in the compound annual 
growth rate for a typical S&P 500 firm; moreover, because stock awards account for the largest 
component of executive compensation, this finding has a significant impact on the growth of 
executive compensation as a whole. 
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Option Awards 
 For S&P 500 firms, the average growth rate of option awards is 2.6%. However, for firms 
that had recently implemented an additional anti-takeover provision, option awards decreased at 
an average rate of 2.4%. Not only does this 191.6% decrease in the growth rate imply a shift in 
favoritism away from option awards, but this finding also implies that firms that had recently 
implemented an anti-takeover provision have uniquely different compensation packages as a 
whole. Further, because option awards account for approximately one-eighth of an executive’s 
total compensation, this rate of decline has a tangible impact on the total compensation of 
executives more broadly. 
 
Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation 
Non-equity incentive plan compensation increased at an average rate of 1.5% for all S&P 
500 firms. After the implementation of an anti-takeover provision, the growth rate of non-equity 
incentive plan compensation significantly decreased to an average rate of decline of 7.0%, a 
557.9% decrease from the average of all firms. Accounting for one-fifth of total executive 
compensation, the sign reversal in the growth rate of non-equity incentive plan compensation, 
coupled with a significant increase in the growth rate of stock awards, appears to indicate that 
firms that had recently implemented an anti-takeover provision prefer to provide equity-based 
compensation above other forms of compensation.  
 
Pension-Based Compensation 
Pension-based compensation declined at an average rate of 3.7% for all S&P 500 firms. 
After the implementation of an anti-takeover provision, the rate of decline for pension-based 
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compensation increased to 5.7%, a 53.1% increase in comparison to the average of all firms. 
Although pension-based compensation accounted for approximately one-twentieth of an 
executive’s total compensation, this increase in the rate of decline indicates a temporal shift in 
granting compensation as a whole. Firms that have recently implemented an anti-takeover 
provision appear to favor granting executives additional compensation upfront rather than in long-
term incentive plans.  
 
All Other Compensation 
 All other compensation was historically the smallest component of executive compensation 
packages for S&P 500 firms, accounting for approximately one-fortieth of total compensation. The 
rate of growth of all other compensation was 6.3% for all S&P 500 firms; however, the growth 
rate for firms that had recently implemented an additional anti-takeover provision was 48.6%, 
corresponding to a 667.2% increase in the growth rate of all other compensation. These firms 
appear to provide executives with additional benefits through this form of compensation in 
comparison to the rest of the S&P 500 as a whole. 
 
Overall Trends  
 While there is a marked shift in the compensation schemes of firms that have recently 
implemented an anti-takeover provision, the compound annual growth rate of total compensation 
also increased from 4.1%, for all S&P 500 firms, to 5.9%, for firms that had recently implemented 
an anti-takeover provision. This change corresponds to a 42.2% increase in the growth rate of total 
executive compensation for firms that have recently implemented an anti-takeover provision. 
Thus, firms that have recently implemented these provisions not only compensate executives 
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differently than the average of the S&P 500, but these firms also compensate CEOs more 
significantly as a whole. These firms displayed sign reversals in the growth rates of option awards 
and non-equity incentive plan compensation; moreover, these firms demonstrated an increased 
willingness to compensate executives through stock awards rather than through more long-term 
incentive structures. While the level of managerial influence exerted on corporate boards is 
uniquely opaque, it appears that the implementation of an anti-takeover provision results in 
increased compensation for executives as both actions are beneficial for executives to the detriment 
of the firm, in terms of reduced corporate profits and decreased shareholder returns. These results 
indicate an apparent need for the reformation of existing corporate governance regulations in order 
to better ensure that managers are unable to exert influence over corporate boards moving forward. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Overview 
 The aforementioned results indicate that the implementation of an anti-takeover provision 
by a publicly traded firm within the S&P 500 predicts a shift in both the composition of executive 
compensation packages as well as a shift in the growth rate of all compensation components as a 
whole. These findings appear to indicate that current regulations, which have largely attempted to 
curtail seemingly exorbitant compensation schemes, may simply lack the necessary power to shift 
intra-firm negotiation dynamics towards an adequate level of independence. The following section 
is broken down into three components. First, the discussion will explore potential explanations for 
the observed shift in compensation schemes following the implementation of an anti-takeover 
provision. Second, this section analyzes the shortfalls of existing regulations in preventing the 
exertion of managerial influence over the board of directors. Last, this section proposes a series of 
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reforms that may assist regulatory bodies in ensuring adequate independence in compensation 
negotiations and in preventing the misuse of managerial influence moving forward.  
 
Potential Causes for Altered Compensation Schemes 
Overview 
 Generally, the implementation of an anti-takeover provision should not have a direct 
impact on the compensation received by an executive as these two corporate governance decisions 
are not systemically interrelated. When a firm implements an additional anti-takeover provision, 
excluding circumstances in which the firm is operating under the threat of acquisition, it appears 
that executives largely become the sole beneficiaries of this governance measure as it results in 
increased job security. Thus, it appears that managerial self-interest, coupled with non-
confrontational corporate boards, lead to a marked shift in compensation following the 
implementation of an anti-takeover provision.  
 
Managerial Self-Interest 
 The primary research hypothesis explored in this paper assumes that, if a publicly traded 
firm implements an anti-takeover provision, then executives are more likely to exert influence over 
the structure of their own compensation packages. Because of the benefits conveyed to executives 
following the implementation of an anti-takeover provision, such as increased job security and 
negotiating leverage in the event of an attempted hostile takeover, managers may simply be 
exerting influence over their corporate board for their own interests. As an extension of the 
managerial power hypothesis proposed by Bebchuk and Fried in 2003, it appears that managers 
use both accumulated influence and social capital to help ensure certain benefits accrue to their 
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position, rather than to shareholders, within publicly traded firms. This is largely due to two 
primary reasons. First, the relative frequency of takeovers for firms with high levels of anti-
takeover provisions is markedly lower than those firms with few to no anti-takeover provisions. 
Under this outcome, it follows that managers are more insulated and protected in their roles as an 
executive of the firm. By reducing the pressure of corporate raiders and hostile bidders over the 
actions of a potential target firm, anti-takeover provisions reduce the need for managers to 
capitulate to market demands. Their decisions can largely be viewed as being seemingly 
independent from those of the shareholders of a firm, who may want to receive capital gains 
through the takeover premium paid in the event of an acquisition, leading to less efficient 
management as a whole. Thus, managers can effectively discount the threat of removal by making 
it incrementally more difficult to consummate takeovers in the status quo through the 
implementation of anti-takeover provisions. Because of this insulating effect, it follows that 
executives may also desire to influence other corporate governance decisions, such as those 
regarding compensation, for their own benefit if the board has implemented measures that benefit 
them in the past.  
 
Non-Confrontational Corporate Boards 
 When viewed through a game theory perspective, it becomes clear that capitulating to the 
desires of the chief executive officer of a firm reduces the likelihood of conflict and tension in the 
long run. In the scenario in which a corporate board approves an anti-takeover provision advocated 
for by the executives of a firm, it follows that other desires of these executives, such as increased 
compensation, may also be granted as a way to appease the executive. Further, the observable 
ratcheting of compensation by publicly traded firms appears to indicate an inherent desire by 
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corporate boards to ensure the satisfaction of executives as a whole (Bebchuk and Fried, Pay 
Without Performance: Overview of the Issues 2004). When corporate boards begin to prioritize 
the desires of executives over those of the shareholders of a firm, it becomes clear that existing 
corporate governance regulations do not go far enough in ensuring independence and preventing 
the granting of favors in order to ensure shareholder value maximization. The debate regarding the 
appropriateness of shareholder value maximization is far from settled; however, as residual owners 
of a publicly traded firm, shareholders benefit when the overall value of a firm is maximized due 
to the fixed value of leverage in calculating enterprise value. As noted in figure 3 and figure 4, the 
growth rate of total compensation increases by 42.2% following the implementation of an anti-
takeover provision relative to the S&P 500 as a whole. If those firms that have approved the 
implementation of a measure that insulates executives also grants those executives more robust 
compensation as well, it appears that corporate boards have reduced the overall importance of 
shareholder value maximization as both actions empirically reduce shareholder value. Moreover, 
corporate boards are largely hesitant to pay CEOs a level below the average reported by 
compensation consultants, which has led to the increasing use of stock-based compensation as a 
means to camouflage the total value of compensation received by an executive.54 Thus, the relative 
lack of emphasis on value maximization by the boards of publicly traded firms seems to indicate 
a misalignment of the incentives of shareholders, managers, and the directors of these firms as a 
whole. 
 
 
                                                 
54 Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2004. "Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues." Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance 8-23. 
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Shortfalls of Existing Corporate Governance Regulations 
Overview 
As previously discussed, existing regulations largely aim to incentivize firms to 
compensate executives in a particular manner. For instance, the IRS imposes a cap on the tax 
deductibility of certain components of executive compensation, such as salary and deferred 
compensation payouts, which incentivizes firms to compensate their executives at least the cap set 
in these regulations. This section will explore the failure of tax incentives to serve as a cap to the 
value of certain components of executive compensation, as well as the failure of SEC regulations, 
such as say on pay, to give existing shareholders a more powerful platform to directly impact 
compensation packages as a whole.  
 
Failure of Tax Incentives to Curtail Compensation Growth 
 Fundamentally, federal regulators have utilized the internal revenue code (I.R.C.) to 
provide tax incentives to compensate executives in a particular manner. I.R.C. § 457A and I.R.C. 
§ 162(m) both attempted to make excessive compensation less attractive to publicly traded firms 
by creating an excise tax on particular compensation types and limiting the tax deductibility of 
particular forms of compensation, respectively.55 However, these incentives purportedly became 
viewed as the minimum level of acceptable compensation for executives, rather than as a cap, 
resulting in the increased ratcheting of the total value of compensation as a whole. Generally, it 
appears that firms have accepted the increased costs associated with compensating their executives 
above the levels set for tax purposes due to a combination of corporate boards wanting to keep 
executives satisfied with their compensation and executives wanting to extract the maximum 
                                                 
55 Kennedy, Kathryn J. 2012. "The Use of Federal Law to Curb Excessive Executive Compensation: Lessons in Past 
Failures and Lessons for the Future." Villanova Law Review 551-570. 
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amount of value for the effort they exert in their roles. These idiosyncratic characteristics of 
publicly traded firms have significantly reduced the impact that tax regulations can have on 
reigning in compensation. Instead of better aligning compensation structures with the normative 
optimal level of compensation set by federal regulators, tax regulations appear to have had a 
noticeable detrimental impact. Moreover, this failure of tax regulations has had a uniquely negative 
impact on shareholder value as incremental compensation granted to executives carries an 
additional tax burden that had not existed previously. Thus, federal regulations have essentially 
perpetuated a system that shifts value from the shareholders of a firm to the US government and 
executives more generally. Overall, it is clear that additional regulations on executive 
compensation through the tax code will not provide a viable solution to the existing problems that 
currently pervade executive compensation negotiations. 
 
Failure of Federal Securities Regulations to Curtail Compensation Growth 
Under the purview of federal securities regulators, publicly traded firms have had to 
comply with increasingly complex corporate governance regulations. In recent years, federal 
regulators have relied upon federal securities regulations to attempt to reign in the growth of 
executive compensation packages. Particularly, following the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, 
the Dodd-Frank reforms became ubiquitously applied to all publicly traded firms, most notably 
resulting in the imposition of say on pay requirements allowing shareholders to have a voice in 
approving the compensation granted to an executive in a given year. However, because say on pay 
proxy votes are not binding for the board of directors in terms of ultimate approval for 
compensation packages, this increased regulation has not had a tangible impact on curtailing the 
growth of compensation as a whole. Instead, executive compensation has continued its historic 
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rise in recent years. Moreover, because the imposition of an anti-takeover defense not only predicts 
a 42.2% increase in the growth rate of total compensation but also a 54.2% increase in the growth 
rate of stock-based compensation, it is clear that federal securities regulations have not been 
successful in either granting shareholders additional power in approving compensation or in 
remedying the lack of independence on corporate boards. Specifically, Section 952 § 10C(a) (2) 
of the Dodd-Frank Act, which imposed increased independence standards on the Compensation 
Committee, largely misses the mark in terms of ensuring that compensation negotiations occur at 
an arm’s length basis. The primary findings of this research paper indicate that managers not only 
exert influence over the board of directors to implement provisions that provide increased job 
security but also that they lobby for increased levels of compensation in forms that may actually 
be higher when taking into account the value appreciation of stock-based compensation. Overall, 
it is clear that federal securities regulations have also resulted in a tangible failure in reigning in 
the compensation decisions of publicly traded companies within the United States.  
 
Potential Reforms to Existing Executive Compensation Regulations 
Overview 
 Because of the failure of both tax incentives and federal securities regulations to reign in 
executive compensation, additional reforms need to be deliberated and implemented in order to 
better ensure that managers do not exert influence over corporate boards moving forward. As this 
paper does not take a final position on the appropriateness of current levels of compensation, the 
following recommendations center around making it increasingly difficult for executives to impact 
the decision-making processes of corporate boards. Largely, existing research has focused on the 
change in managerial decision processes associated with varying levels of anti-takeover 
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protections; however, this area of research has not explored the incentives that managers have to 
advocate for such provisions and does not attempt to reconcile this with changes in the behavior 
of corporate boards. This section proposes two primary reforms to current corporate governance 
regulations. The first recommendation would restrict the ability of corporate boards to increase the 
growth rate the compensation of executives within one year of the implementation of an anti-
takeover provision. The second recommendation would require publicly traded firms to provide 
justifications for increases in executive compensation in order to increase the efficacy of say on 
pay requirements as a whole. 
 
Delayed Executive Compensation Increases  
 Because of the significant structural changes in executive compensation packages 
following the implementation of an anti-takeover provision, this recommendation would make it 
incrementally harder for managerial influence to result in both increased protection and 
compensation for executives. This reform would likely be implemented as an addition to existing 
federal securities regulations that restrict the actions of publicly traded firms in the status quo. The 
justification for this reform is three-fold. First, because executives are likely to have existing 
relationships with the board of directors, it is difficult to ensure that managerial influence will 
cease to be utilized through regulation. Instead, this reform assumes that managers will still utilize 
their status within their respective firms in order to influence the actions approved by the board of 
directors as a whole. By doing so, it becomes clear that restricting the type of decisions that can 
be considered by corporate boards will result in a reduction of the power this influence has to 
enable publicly traded firms to convey incremental benefits to executives. While this reform may 
not be able to prevent managers for advocating for increased compensation, this reform would 
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both increase the transparency of the granting of favors between the board of directors and the 
executive and would serve as an overarching reduction in the power of managerial influence more 
broadly. Thus, the restriction of managerial influence is more effective than existing regulations 
as it targets the primary pathway utilized to increase at a rate above that of the firm’s historical 
increases. 
 
Reporting Justifications for Increases in Compensation Growth 
 Generally, say on pay initiatives lack the structural power to reign in executive 
compensation in that these votes are non-binding over the board of directors in the final approval 
of compensation packages. The current problems that pervade executive compensation 
negotiations seemingly stem from a lack of adequate independence in the compensation setting 
processes in the status quo. As previously discussed, corporate boards are hesitant to pay an 
executive below the average compensation reported by compensation consultants, leading to a 
scenario in which executive compensation growth has an upward trending bias.56 With varying 
levels of social capital attained by executives, compensation setting procedures not only tend to 
result in ever-increasing compensation, but executives may utilize their power to advocate for even 
higher levels of compensation, particularly advocating for stock-based compensation. This desired 
shift towards equity-based compensation is understandable as any appreciation in the market price 
of a company’s stock would result in an increase in the total value of compensation granted in a 
given year. Thus, while attempting to remove all interaction between corporate boards and 
executives would both unrealistic and infeasible, imposing additional regulations that require 
written justifications for increases in executive compensation would inherently reduce the opacity 
                                                 
56 Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2004. "Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues." Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance 8-23. 
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and inefficiency of compensation setting procedures. This improvement is due to two primary 
reasons. First, written justifications reported alongside say on pay compensation disclosures would 
enable shareholders to gain insight as to the reasoning for any positive deviation in the historical 
growth rates of executive compensation. If a publicly traded firm has displayed below average 
market performance but compensation begins to display exponential growth, the shareholders of 
the firm would increasingly rely on these written disclosures to determine if this corporate 
governance action is in their best interest. In a scenario in which shareholders do not believe that 
the board is independently evaluating and approving compensation packages, and is, instead, 
granting a favor to the chief executive of a firm, it would become incrementally more likely that 
the board of directors would be replaced during the following voting cycle. Moreover, should an 
additional anti-takeover provision be implemented around the same time period as an observed 
increase in the growth rate of executive compensation, this proposed regulation would make it 
increasingly difficult to justify a second corporate governance action that reduces shareholder 
returns. 
 Second, should both recommended reforms be implemented simultaneously, the exertion 
of managerial power would become less impactful as the association between anti-takeover 
provisions and executive compensation growth is robustly identified through the findings of this 
paper. Normatively, managers should attempt to undertake corporate actions that increase the 
value of the firm as this satisfies executives’ fiduciary responsibility to both the firm and its 
shareholders as a whole. However, if managers decide to use the structural power associated with 
their position in the firm, this increased standard for justifying increases in compensation would 
make it more difficult for corporate boards to grant favors to executives, such as increasing 
compensation and implementing anti-takeover provisions, without drawing suspicion from the 
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shareholders of a firm. This regulation would not remove the possibility of shareholder apathy in 
which shareholders simply do not take action to curtail value destructive corporate actions after 
the revelation of such actions. However, the goal of this regulation is not to entirely prevent 
managers from undertaking potentially value destructive actions; instead, the aim of this regulation 
is to provide shareholders with additional information in an attempt to shift power from executives 
to the shareholders of a firm. The directors of a firm would also be incentivized to refrain from 
capitulating to managerial demands as any action that knowingly decreases the value of a firm 
could be used as a basis for their removal in an upcoming election. Thus, by modifying the 
incentives that pervade executive compensation setting procedures in the status quo, this proposed 
regulatory reform could result in increased shareholder value creation moving forward.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 In recent decades, the growth rate of executive compensation has outpaced the rate of value 
appreciation of the S&P 500. While some scholars attempt to examine the appropriateness of such 
an increase, this paper, instead, explores a potential explanation for these increases: the exertion 
of managerial influence over corporate boards. This research paper has demonstrated a link 
between the implementation of an anti-takeover defense and a marked increase of approximately 
42% in the growth rate of executive compensation packages in comparison to the S&P 500 
average. Moreover, this paper has demonstrated that corporate boards are more likely to 
compensate executives through equity-based measures, instead of long-term incentive plans, 
following the implementation of an anti-takeover provision, further reinforcing that a link between 
managerial influence and executive compensation exists in the status quo. This research paper also 
explored the rationale for reforming existing corporate governance regulations as they fail to 
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adequately prevent the exertion of managerial influence. The proposed reforms provided by this 
paper, which curtail the ability of the corporate board to undertake a simultaneous adoption of anti-
takeover provisions and the ratcheting of compensation without providing written justifications to 
shareholders, aim to better enable shareholders to take action in addressing these issues moving 
forward. Overall, while this paper has not attempted to take a stance on the adequacy or 
appropriateness of the current levels of executive compensation, this paper has provided evidence 
that managers may be exerting substantial influence over their own compensation under current 
regulations.  
 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
While this paper has explored the link between anti-takeover provisions and executive 
compensation, more research should be done in order to determine a causal link between other 
corporate actions and managerial influence. Moreover, because of idiosyncratic factors that may 
affect the growth rates of executive compensation across varying firms, more research should be 
done in an attempt to control for these factors to see if the observed relationship remains robust. 
Lastly, it will be important to examine if the implementation of a particular type of anti-takeover 
provision is more significantly predictive of a shift in the compensation structure of publicly traded 
firms in order to better design regulations that attempt to prevent the exertion of managerial 
influence moving forward.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: This table provides the average growth rates of each component of the executive 
compensation packages for all S&P 500 firms for the subset of firms that have implemented an 
anti-takeover provision. The change is calculated using the average growth rate of all S&P 500 
firms as the initial condition. 
 
 
Table 2: This table provides the change in the percentage of total compensation accounted for by 
each component of executive compensation packages for all S&P 500 firms. The change is 
calculated using the starting percentage as the initial condition. 
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Table 3: This table provides the change in the percentage of total compensation accounted for by 
each component of executive compensation packages for the subset of S&P 500 firms that 
implemented an anti-takeover provision during the period from 2010 - 2017. As in table 2, the 
change is calculated using the starting percentage as the initial condition. 
 
.  
Table 4: This table provides the percentage of total compensation that is accounted for by salary 
from the year prior to two years after the implementation of an anti-takeover provision. The table 
also reports the change in the total value of this component, as well as the numerical percentage 
change and the compound annual growth rate for the period.  
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Table 5: This table provides the percentage of total compensation that is accounted for by bonuses 
from the year prior to two years after the implementation of an anti-takeover provision. The table 
also reports the change in the total value of this component, as well as the numerical percentage 
change and the compound annual growth rate for the period.  
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Table 6: This table provides the percentage of total compensation that is accounted for by stock 
awards from the year prior to two years after the implementation of an anti-takeover provision. 
The table also reports the change in the total value of this component, as well as the numerical 
percentage change and the compound annual growth rate for the period.  
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Table 7: This table provides the percentage of total compensation that is accounted for by option 
awards from the year prior to two years after the implementation of an anti-takeover provision. 
The table also reports the change in the total value of this component, as well as the numerical 
percentage change and the compound annual growth rate for the period.  
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Table 8: This table provides the percentage of total compensation that is accounted for by non-
equity incentive plans from the year prior to two years after the implementation of an anti-takeover 
provision. The table also reports the change in the total value of this component, as well as the 
numerical percentage change and the compound annual growth rate for the period.  
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Table 9: This table provides the percentage of total compensation that is accounted for by pension-
based compensation from the year prior to two years after the implementation of an anti-takeover 
provision. The table also reports the change in the total value of this component, as well as the 
numerical percentage change and the compound annual growth rate for the period.  
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Table 10: This table provides the percentage of total compensation that is accounted for by all 
other compensation from the year prior to two years after the implementation of an anti-takeover 
provision. The table also reports the change in the total value of this component, as well as the 
numerical percentage change and the compound annual growth rate for the period.  
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Table 11: This table provides the percentage of total compensation that is accounted for by total 
compensation from the year prior to two years after the implementation of an anti-takeover 
provision. This table is used as a robustness check to ensure that the percentage accounted for by 
all components of executive compensation total to 100.0%. The table also reports the numerical 
percentage change in value of total compensation during the period.   
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